In 2014, Indonesia implemented a new, nationwide, subsidised universalcoverage health insurance program, under which poor Indonesians do not pay to become members and others pay a relatively low fee. This program has created a national debate about the effectiveness of the ownership of health insurance in increasing the use of health services-particularly among the poor-given the limitations in their quantity and quality. Using membership data on different health insurance programs from the 2007 rounds of Susenas and Riskesdas, this article researches the impact of having health insurance on health service utilisation, by controlling the levels of quality and quantity of health services in the area. We argue that having health insurance increases health service utilisation by approximately eight percentage points when people feel sick (or by approximately five percentage points if we include those who do not feel sick).
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 2000s, the Indonesian government has been interested in rolling out a nationwide, subsidised universalcoverage health insurance program, not least because outofpocket expenditure as a percentage of private expenditure on health has remained relatively high and made health care utilisation inequitable. In 2001, for example, the ratio of consultation rates for doctors among people in the poorest and the richest quintiles was 0.8 (OECD and World Health Organization 2012), whereas it was expected to be closer to 1.0.
In January 2014, Indonesia implemented such a health insurance program: poor Indonesians do not pay to join, while others pay a relatively low fee. The program is expected to reduce outofpocket expenditure (Aji et al. 2013) , 1 which composed approximately 80% of private health expenditure in Indonesia between 2005 , before dropping to around 77% between 2009 . Comparable percentages in Malaysia and Thailand were lower, at 76% and 66%, respectively, between 2005 , and 77% and 57% between 2009 Yet the program has created a national debate (as have similar programs in other developing countries) about its effectiveness in increasing the utilisation of health services-particularly among the poor-given the existing quantity and quality of public health services. Its implementation brings with it several challenges, particularly for the supply side of providing health services. First, the disparity among levels of development in Indonesia remains great (Vidyattama 2013) , and there are concerns about whether there is sufficient access to health services-particularly in less developed areas with challenging geographical conditions-and whether the poor have enough information to understand the benefits of having health insurance. Second, the provision of universal health insurance may potentially increase the burden on the capacity of the public health system, which has been argued to be already stretched, even without the application of a universal scheme (World Bank 2012) . Third, the supply of health providers in Indonesia, especially on the public side, has been affected by economic downturns. The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, for example, reduced the funding allocated to maintaining the country's network of health centres, including hospitals, community health clinics (puskesmas), and local, integrated health care posts (posyandus) (Hotchkiss and Jacobalis 1999) . In addition, decentralisation has shifted the administration of the formerly centralised network to the local government. Although some health centres have benefited from funding allocated by their local governments, many have faced a lack of transparency in local government management or a lack of funding in certain district governments (Kristiansen and Santoso 2006) . This has diminished the supply of public health providers or facilities. It is therefore important to understand and anticipate the increase in demand for health services that may follow the implementation of subsidised universalcoverage health insurance.
Using membership data for various health insurance programs in Indonesiathat is, private or nonsubsidised, partially subsidised, and fully subsidised health insurance programs-this article researches the role of health insurance membership in the decision to seek treatment at a health facility when one feels sick. It controls for accessibility and for the quality and quantity of health services across areas, among other variables. This article also attempts to estimate the impact of health insurance ownership on the use of health services, taking into account their quantity and quality, regardless of whether the insurance owner feels sick-that is, it considers those using the services for preventive care. It also observes other individual demographic, socioeconomic, and geographical location characteristics affecting the effectiveness of health insurance membership in determining the decision to access health services. was shown to have increased hospital outpatient and inpatient utilisation (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005, Wagstaff et al. 2009 ). A similar result was found in Senegal (Jütting 2003) , but not among the poor in remote areas of Vietnam (Wagstaff 2007 , Ekman et al. 2008 . Studies of lowincome countries have also found that the impact of this policy is not significant for certain groups in society (Ekman 2004 , McIntyre 2007 . Hence, there has been serious debate about the effectiveness of such a policy. So far, such studies of Indonesia have been relatively limited. Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow (2007) assessed the effectiveness of the implementation of the socialsafetynet (SSN) Health Card program (which gives the poor free access to government health services) as a response to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Hidayat et al. (2004) and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) analysed the impact of mandatory health insurance for civil servants (Asuransi Kesehatan [Askes] ) and the governmentprovided insurance scheme through PT Jamsostek on outpatient visits at public and private health facilities.
This article differs from those of Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow (2007) , Hidayat et al. (2004) , and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) in several ways. First, it investigates the impact of membership across different health insurance schemes; Pradhan et al.'s (2007) study examines only the fully subsidised health insurance scheme for the poor, and the studies of Hidayat et al. (2004) and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) examine only the Askes and PT Jamsostek schemes. Although this article does not focus on measuring the performance of each scheme, it attempts to observe possible variations among them in the impact of membership. Second, this article analyses data from the 2007 rounds of the Basic Health Research Survey (Riset Kesehatan Dasar [Riskedas] ) and the National Socioeconomic Survey (Survei Sosial Ekonomi Nasional [Susenas] ). The Riskesdas database covers the nation, in contrast to the Indonesia Family Life Survey database used by Hidayat et al. (2004) and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) . Furthermore, Riskesdas provides more reliable information on health service utilisation and the types of diseases affecting household members. It also includes variables that are not captured in Susenas-the main dataset used in Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow's (2007) study-and that may influence one's decision about accessing health services, such as the travel time to the nearest health service provider and the distance to the provincial capital city. Third, this article's period of observation differs from those used by Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow (2007) , Hidayat et al. (2004) , and Hidayat and Pokhrel (2009) , who focused on the crisis years of 1997-98. This article looks at 2007, which can be considered a normal year.
This article has its shortcomings. For example, it is not able to distinguish between the role of health insurance membership in a person's decision, when sick, to seek treatment at a public health facility or at a private health facility. This article also does not discuss the impact of health insurance membership on out ofpocket health expenditure. It attempts to take account of these shortcomings in its concluding sections.
HEALTH INSURANCE PROVISION IN INDONESIA
Health insurance in Indonesia has a long history; in the colonial period, insurance companies provided policies to middleincome earners, and organisations such as labour unions established mutual health insurance plans for their members. Such Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 02:09 13 December 2014 forms of health insurance continued after independence in 1945 (Soedjono 1956 ). The government's first major attempt to introduce health insurance for public servants took the form of Askes, in 1968 (table 1) . 4 In 1969, several community organisations introduced the Health Fund (Dana Sehat) program, which operated under a microfinance scheme. This program was promoted by the government, and provided a kind of health insurance for its members. Despite having government support, the Health Fund program was not adopted by the majority of Indonesia's population (Nugroho and Elliott 1977) ; it suffered from high dropout rates, lowquality benefits, limited coverage, and lack of access for the poor, among other problems (Thabrany et al. 2003) .
In 1992, a new communitybased health insurance program, Jaringan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat (JPKM), was launched in parallel with an improved Health Fund (Soors et al. 2010) . This was the Indonesian version of a managed care program, inspired by the health maintenance organisations (HMOs) of the United States. (HMOs combined a commercialbased health insurance model with social aims of reaching the poor.) Yet owing to the underfunding of the JPKM program and the poor quality of its benefits, fewer than 500,000 people registered as members, so it was also considered unsuccessful and its expansion was put on hold (ScheilAdlung 2004) . At the same time, Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja (Jamsostek) was introduced to provide health insurance for private, formalsector employees and employers.
5
In 1994, the Ministry of Health introduced the first stage of its Health Card program covering puskesmas and targeted to poor households (Johar 2009 (Johar , 2010 . These cards were poorly distributed, however, because there were no proper guidelines to help puskesmas distribute the cards among the poor and no incentives for them to do so.
In 1998, in an effort to soften the impact of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis on the poor, the Indonesian government implemented a major SSN program, Jaringan Pengaman Sosial. This program involved the largescale provision of SSN health cards to the poor-this was the government's second health card program-to allow them to receive free health treatment from government health centres. Initially, the program was implemented using the JPKM-HMO model, with hundreds of JPKMs established at the provincial and district levels. Yet most of these JPKMs failed to perform, so the Ministry of Health took over the management of the program and distributed the funds directly to provincial or district health offices instead. Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow (2007) , from their impact evaluation research, found that approximately 34% of households in the lowest quintile owned SSN health cards and that the use of modern health care among holders of health cards increased. (If we include the secondlowest quintile, 59% of households owned cards.) However, the implementation of the SSN program faced problems, including mistargeting-leakage to wealthier households was substantial. Wealthier Brodsky, Habib, and Hirschfeld (2003, 146) ; Johar (2009 Johar ( , 2010 ; Rokx et al. (2009, Soors et al. (2010) .
Note: JPKM = Jaringan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat. HMOs = health maintenance organisations. Bapels = managed care organisations. a JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) was not limited to health subsidies; it covered workfare, subsidised rice sales, targeted scholarships, and village block grants. The program was implemented using the JPKM-HMO model as the 'carrier' at the provincial and district levels.
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households, in the fourth and fifth quintiles, held about 20% of the health cards (Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow 2007) . Further, the issue of transportation (such as the availability of road infrastructures and public transport between the location of the poor and the nearest health service provider) and its related cost hindered participation in the program by the poor. In 2004, the Health Card program was replaced by a health insurance program for the poor, Asuransi Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin (Askeskin). The main objective of this scheme was to expand socialsecurity program coverage to the informal sector. Sparrow, Suryahadi, and Widyanti (2013) argued that Askeskin can be considered successful in targeting the poor and increasing the use of outpatient services by the poor. Nevertheless, there is evidence for a slight increase in outof pocket expenditure in urban areas, probably because of an increase in relatively more expensive hospital care-an increase that Askeskin has not fully covered (Sparrow, Suryahadi, and Widyanti 2013) .
Askeskin was then expanded into Jamkesmas (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat) in 2008, to cover (some of) the nearpoor. 6 The program was fully financed by the central government and administered by the Ministry of Health, with both public and private health providers involved. Despite Jamsekmas covering more of the nearpoor than previous programs, Harimurti et al. (2014) argued that it covered only approximately 47% of Indonesia's poor and nearpoor households. Although it has increased utilisation rates, particularly for outpatient services, it has faced challenges. These include evidence of substantial mistargeting and leakages to the nonpoor (20% of Jamkesmas beneficiaries in 2010 were in the top three deciles); low levels of socialisation and awareness of benefits; inconsistencies across regions in applying targeting criteria and providing basic benefits; and poor accountability and relatively low levels of financial protection (Harimurti et al. 2014) .
In addition to Jamkesmas, several regional governments established a regional health insurance program called Jamkesda, designed mostly as an extension of Jamkesmas, with the objective of covering a population of nearpoor on top of that covered by Jamkesmas.
7 By the late 2000s, various private health insurance programs had also been established in Indonesia. Major Indonesian banks, such as BNI, Mandiri, and BCA offered such programs to their clients. Private health insurance can also be obtained from several private Indonesian insurance companies, such as PT Sinarmas, PT Adisarana Wanartha, and PT Tugu Mandiri. Multinational insurance companies, such as Prudential, Allianz, and Commonwealth Life, also entered the Indonesian health insurance market in the 2000s.
Based on data from the Ministry of Health (2013), by December 2012 more than 163 million people, or 69% of the population, were covered in one way or another 6. Some of the nearpoor were covered because targeting the nearpoor is difficult, and because many people are living just above the poverty line, so a slight change in the definition of 'nearpoor' means that a lot of people fall either in or out of the nearpoor group. To give an idea of the numbers of people missing out, an assessment by the World Bank (2011) claimed that approximately 52% of the poorest 30% of the population were still without health insurance in 2010. 7. We include these different health care programs in our definition of health insurance, since health care is considered to be fully subsidised health insurance.
Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 02:09 13 December 2014 by health insurance. Jamkesmas, which covered more than 76 million people in 2010, is the largest health insurance scheme. Nevertheless, at least 30% of Indonesians-mostly the poor and the nearpoor-were still not covered by any kind of medical insurance at the end of 2012.
On 1 January 2014, the Indonesian government launched the first stage of the new Universal National Health Insurance scheme organised by the newly established Social Security Management Agency (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial [BPJS] ). This new scheme will integrate Jamkesmas with all other health insurance programs, including Askes, Jamsostek, and some of the Jamkesda schemes. Its launch was based on two pieces of legislation: Law 40/2004 on the National Social Security System and Law 24/2011 on the Social Security Management Agency.
BPJS has set a firststage target of insuring at least 121.6 million people by the end of 2014, while the final target of the scheme is to insure the whole population by 2019 (around 268 million people). It aims to provide a comprehensive package, which includes not only curative services but also preventive and rehabilitative services, and to cover all types of natural illness. Yet the calculation of insurance premiums is complex and depends on the employment status of the recipients. For example, the government will provide a monthly subsidy for people categorised as poor. However, employers and employees will need to share 5%-6% of wages to pay the insurance premium, while those who work in the informal sector will need to contribute 5%-6% of their monthly income (Simmonds and Hort 2013) .
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This article develops a reduced demand function of health services-that is, a demand function that takes into account various conditions on the supply side, paying particular attention to membership and the types of health insurance held. The most widely cited model in the research on the demand for health services is the behavioural model (BM) developed in 1968 by Ronald M. Andersen, an American medical sociologist (Andersen 1968) . The latest iteration of this BM (in Babitsch, Gohl, and Von Lengerke 2012) includes three groups of factors: predisposing factors, which include individual characteristics such as age, sex, ethnicity, and family type, as well as cultural norms and the demographic and social composition of communities; enabling factors, which include the income and wealth of an individual and whether they have health insurance, as well as factors representing the supply side of health services, such as the availability of health service facilities and personnel, their travel time, and the means of transportation; and need factors, including the perceived need for health services, individuals' perceptions of their need to utilise health care, and the evaluated need (that is, professional assessments of patients' health status and the need for care).
In implementing this BM, researchers often modify the model or add determinants such as the spatial location of residence. Pradhan, Saadah, and Sparrow (2007) argued the importance of this determinant, owing to, in their case, systematic differences between regions in the allocation of health insurance coverage (the Health Card) and health care funding. The importance of spatial location is also the focus of Erlyana, Damrongplasit, and Melnick's (2011) study of health service utilisation. Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 02:09 13 December 2014
LopezCevallos and Chi (2010) developed a modified version of the BM for Ecuador. The need factors in this model are based on the responses of individuals with health problems during a certain period and on how many health problems individuals mentioned in the past. They also divided the utilisation of health care services into preventive care (for example, if an individual has visited a physician for a preventive appointment in the last 30 days) and curative care (for example, whether an individual has visited a physician for a curative appointment in the last 30 days or has been hospitalised in the last 12 months).
Another modification made by researchers involves extending the implementation of the model, for further analysis. Jütting (2003) , for example, who analysed the impact of a communitybased health insurance scheme for the poor in rural Senegal, used a similar approach to Andersen's (1968) BM, not only for health care utilisation but also for health care expenditure. Sparrow, Suryahadi, and Widyanti (2013) conducted a similar extension, for an Indonesian case. They observed the determinants of utilisation of outpatient facilities (the number of visits in the last month) at public and private health care providers, outofpocket health spending, and the incidence of catastrophic spending (defined as health spending that exceeds 15% of total household spending). Ensor and Cooper (2004) , in contrast, indirectly examined the determinants of the utilisation of health care by identifying its barriers from the supply and demand sides of health services. The supply side includes input prices such as the cost of staff, capital equipment, and buildings; knowledge of treatment technology; and management efficiency. The demand side includes coverage costs (official and unofficial charges, travel costs, and opportunity costs of lost work); household characteristics (including incomes and level of education); cultural characteristics; and knowledge of available health care.
In estimating these models of health service utilisation, the most common complications involve selfselection and endogeneity. The first arises from nonsick people not being included in the regression sample (Jütting 2003) ; the second arises from a possible reverse causality direction between insurance holders and the demand for health care services (Sparrow, Suryahadi, and Widyanti 2013) . The second relates to the possibility that people have health insurance because they expect to get sick, so growing numbers of insurance holders increase the demand for health care services. In addition, people who join a health insurance program might have other unobservable characteristics that make them more likely to join and might influence their decision to use a health care service (Waters 1999) .
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DATA SOURCES
To research the role of health insurance membership in the decision to seek treatment at a health facility when people feel sick, this article uses a version of the BM specified in the following conditional probit model:
where of formal health services. To estimate equation (1), this article limits its sample to include only those who reported that they felt sick in the previous month.
The binomial variable H i , the main variable of interest in this article, denotes whether individual i has health insurance or is covered by a health care program. The variables in P i represent predisposing factors such as age, sex, marital status, number of family members, and education level, while the variables in E i denote enabling factors such as employment status, household food expenditure as a proxy of income, and variables representing physical access and the condition of the supply sides of health services. In an effort to control the quality of the supply side of health services in the area, we include several geographical variables in this vector, such as the time needed to get to the nearest medical centre, the gross regional product per capita in the resident's district, the local government health budget per capita, the distance from the district to provincial capital cities, and dummies for the island of the resident.
This article is also interested in observing the role of health insurance membership in a nonsick person's decision to use health services for preventive activities such as vaccinations. If information on whether a person utilised a formal health service in the previous month-even if he or she did not feel sick-had been available in the 2007 Susenas and Riskesdas datasets, the model to be estimated, using the whole sample, would be as follows:
However, Susenas and Riskesdas asked whether a person used a formal health service in the previous month only if that person reported that he or she felt sick. We overcome this lack of information in two ways. First, we correct the selection bias by estimating equation (1) using only the cases of those who reported feeling sick in the previous month, applying the Heckman (1979) correction procedure to the whole sample. We use the widespread outbreak of an infectious disease in a village as the main instrument to predict whether someone in the village will report that they felt sick in the previous month.
8 If the instrument is strong, this should be a good enough parameter to represent the impact of health insurance membership in the decision to use health services regardless of whether one feels sick. Second, we reestimate equation (1) with the whole sample; that is, we include those who did not report that they felt sick in the previous month. This procedure is equal to estimating the following joint probit model using the whole sample:
Assuming that Pr X i = 1| Y i = 1 ( ) ≈ 1 (that is, if a person used health services in the previous month, he or she most likely reported feeling sick in that month)
8. The empirical results of this article show that a widespread outbreak of an infectious disease is a valid instrument, as its correlation with the error term of the main equation estimated is relatively insignificant ( that is, less than 1%).
Note that Pr
The main dataset for this article is Susenas, a household survey conducted since 1963 and annually since 1989. It includes data on households (such as household size, household expenditure, and type of housing and amenities) and individuals (such as education level, employment status, sex, and age). This article uses data from the core Susenas module of 2007, since its sample of 280,000 households was also the sample used in the 2007 round of Riskesdas, which was based on interviews with the heads of households (Ministry of Health 2008). Together these databases provide a comprehensive picture of the condition of Indonesian households and individuals, especially in relation to health. At the individual level, the database for this article contains 856,592 observations. Considering the size and construction of the sample used in the 2007 rounds of Susenas and Riskesdas, it can be argued that the dataset that we use in this article is representative of the country's general population.
The ability to merge the 2007 Susenas and Riskesdas datasets is the main reason not to use the latest Susenas dataset, for 2012. The merged dataset provides more information on the health status of individuals and is also more reliable than the single 2012 survey. 10 Another reason not to use Susenas alone is that this article would have to rely on a smaller dataset. In 2012, Susenas was conducted quarterly and much of the information is not very comparable, owing to seasonal changes across the quarters. This article would have to limit its data to information from one of these quarterly surveys, which contains fewer observations (approximately 270,000 individuals). Nevertheless, a brief analysis of these data suggests that the results from the 2012 Susenas dataset do not differ much from the results from the 2007 Susenas-Riskesdas dataset.
Among the many variables in the 2007 Susenas-Riskesdas dataset, the main information of interest here is on ownership of health insurance (including being covered by a health care program). The dataset provides information on ownership of insurance policies or coverage by seven health insurance groups: (a) health insurance for civil servants (Askes); (b) social insurance for workers (Jamsostek); (c) private health insurance; (d) reimbursement of health costs by a company; (e) health care for the poor; (f) community health funds; and (g) JPKM and other regional insurance schemes. The Askes group also includes insurance for military veterans and civilservice retirees. The health care for the poor group includes several different schemes targeting people with low incomes-such as Askeskin and Jamkesmas, JPKMM (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat Miskin), JPK Gakin (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Keluarga Miskin), and the Health Card program (Kartu Sehat). Furthermore, the dataset provides details on eight types of illnesses: fever, cough, flu or cold, asthma or breathing difficulties, diarrhoea, headache, toothache, and other unspecified illnesses. As mentioned before, the proxy for health service utilisation is whether an individual was in outpatient care in the previous month. By observing different types of health insurance programs and illnesses, we can investigate the impact of different types of health insurance and health care programs on health service utilisation in response to 10 . Please note that although information on selfreported illness and different types of symptoms is also available in Susenas, this article uses those available in Riskesdas. We believe that the information in Riskesdas is more reliable. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the potential problems of using selfreported information.
Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 02:09 13 December 2014 different types of illness; the response regarding being an outpatient, for example, could differ depending on the type of illness and the type of health insurance coverage that one has. Table 2 shows the percentage of outpatients by illness and region in Indonesia and the percentage of health insurance ownership in 2007.
The first row of table 2 shows that in 2007 approximately 14% of people had been outpatients in the previous month and that 27% of people had some kind of health insurance. Nusa Tenggara reported the highest proportion of outpatients, 20%, and also the highest proportion covered by health insurance, 43%. The 'Not sick' row shows the proportion of people who were not affected by any illness in the previous month, while the 'Any illness' row shows those who reported feeling sick and were affected by any illness in the previous month. This row shows that 45% who reported sick in the previous month sought medical treatment and were treated as outpatients. Among those who reported being sick, only 28% had any Table 3 shows the results from the main estimations conducted for this article, all of which used probit regression as the estimation technique. One of the most efficient unbiased regression techniques available, probit regression uses the maximum likelihood to cumulative distribution function of normal distribution to estimate the coefficients in the regression.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Regression Quality
Our main concern about the results in table 3 is whether our estimation has an endogeneity bias. There are two possible sources of bias: (a) that having health insurance is due to the fact that one expects to get sick (that is, reverse causality), and (b) that we have omitted important variables determining health service utilisation that are correlated with health insurance ownership. We argue against the first potential source of bias, for two reasons. First, the proportions of outpatients are relatively smaller among those with health insurance than among those without it, as the second and third columns of table 2 show.
11 The proportion of outpatients would be much larger if there were an endogeneity bias: people take out some form of health insurance if they know that they are going to use health services. Second, the majority of those with health insurance have it by default (or mandatorily) rather than choice-that is, because they are civil servants, or poor or nearpoor. Private health insurance is the only scheme under which we suspect that those taking out a policy might do so because they expect to be sick in the future. However, the proportion of those with private health insurance is relatively small.
To counter the second possible source of bias, this article added as many determinants as possible to the regressions as control variables. This strategy does not prevent unobserved heterogeneity: a panel data analysis would have been a better approach. However, the dataset used in this article does not allow such an analysis. Our models comprise many variables-including age, education, income, employment status, sector of employment, and household size-which should minimise any bias caused by omitting important determinants.
12 Hence, we argue that the results in table 3 are relatively unbiased. 13 11. By subtracting the second and third columns from the 'All persons' row in table 2, the proportion of people who had health insurance but who did not use health services was 21.8% of the population-much larger than the 4.7% of the population who had health insurance and used health services. 12. To further reduce this issue, one needs to use a longitudinal dataset (unlike the SusenasRiskesdas dataset). 13. To ensure the robustness of our results, we applied an alternative method-the average treatment effect to those who used health services-and used a different degree of Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 02:09 13 December 2014 Models (1a) and (1b) in table 3 show the determinants of health utilisation among those reporting having been sick in the previous month. Models (1c) and (1d) show the results of the Heckman correction procedure, which aimed to estimate the determinants of health utilisation among all individuals-that is, those reporting and not reporting feeling sick in the previous month. Models (3a) and (3b), by estimating equation (3), also aim to estimate the determinants of health utilisation among all individuals.
If having health insurance has a high correlation with being sick, Heckman's (1979) correction estimation procedure will produce relatively unbiased estimation results. In this article, however, the correlation coefficient between health insurance ownership and being sick is only 4.9%. Furthermore, applying Heckman's procedure produces less efficient estimation results than the pure probit model in models (3a) and (3b), as indicated by much lower numbers of log likelihood. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that models (3a) and (3b) provide a more accurate estimation than models (1c) and (1d). Table 3 presents the marginal effects calculated from the results of the probit regressions. Models (1a), (1b), (3a), and (3b) show that the impact of health insurance ownership on health service utilisation is positive and statistically significant. Model (1a), for example, shows that having health insurance increases the probability of using health services by 7.5 percentage points when one feels sick. And, as model (3a) shows, the results for the whole sample suggest that having health insurance increases the probability of using health services by 4.8 percentage points, regardless of whether one feels sick.
The Impact of Health Insurance
Different health insurance programs, however, induce different impacts on health service utilisation, as the estimations of models (1b) and (3b) reveal. Among those who reported being sick-and for the whole population-private health insurance, health cost reimbursement by a company, and Jamsostek increase the use of health services less than other types of insurance. This is logical, since people covered by private health insurance, company reimbursement, or Jamsostek are, in general, better off than civil servants, informalsector workers, and the poor. This result highlights the importance of providing subsidised health insurance to encourage people to seek health services when they feel sick or for preventive care-thus contributing to a healthier society.
14
The results cannot confirm, however, whether there are likely to be concerns about the uptake of health insurance in Indonesia. In his assessment of the implementation of universal health insurance in Asian countries, Wagstaff (2014) points matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997) . The results of this method confirmed that the results in table 3 are relatively robust. The results of the average treatment effect are available from the authors on request. 14. In 2007, the year of this article's dataset, the owners of health insurance for civil servants, health care for the poor, and community health funds could, in most cases, use these programs only when visiting public health providers. The results of this article could be different if the insured were allowed to use these programs to seek private health services, because private health providers in Indonesia typically provide better services and have better facilities than public health providers.
TABLE 3 Marginal Effect on Health Utilisation
Probit estimation of those who are sick 
848,585
Note: All equations include control variables for sex, age, household size, education, employment status, sector of employment, gross regional product per capita, and district health budget, and use food expenditure as a proxy for income. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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out that the the uptake of health insurance among middleincome households is often low because the benefits are perceived to be low. He confirms, however, that this issue is less pronounced in Indonesia than in other Asian countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam. Before the implementation of universal health care in Indonesia, most of the enrolments in the schemes that involve middleincome groups (that is, Askes and Jamsostek) were arranged and paid for by employers or the institution that employed them. The relatively high impact of Askes and Jamsostek in our study indicates that the middleincome group in Indonesia is willing to use health insurance. The government needs to ensure, however, that the reduction in outofpocket spending is significant (Wagstaff 2014) . However, even if the subsidy does not have a significant and direct impact on middle income spending, at least the payment from the insurance could be an incentive for the provider to improve its services (Perrot et al. 2010 ).
Other Determinants of Health Service Utilisation
The impact of predisposing factors on health service utilisation in Indonesia is arguably smaller than the enabling factor of the ownership of health insurance. The impact of age is small, and single people are less likely to use health services or seek medical treatment than those who are married, widowed, or divorced.
15
One explanation could be that single people, who are mostly young, are less inclined to seek treatment when they are sick, believing that they can recover by using overthecounter medicines. In general, females are also less likely than males to seek medical treatment. Yet there is no significant difference between females and males in seeking medical treatment when they feel sick. This could be due to females experiencing a higher opportunity cost than males, or due to females being more careful in managing their money. In any event, females tend to seek health treatment only when they are really sick, otherwise using overthe counter medicines. In estimating the impact of education, we use as a comparison base those who have no school education. The estimation shows that the more education a person has, the less likely they are to use health services when they are sick. A possible explanation is that most individuals in the sample who have no school education are predominantly children aged five years or below. In Indonesian culture, parents would give such children priority in seeking medical treatment. Other explanations could be that the opportunity cost of using health services rises in proportion to the education level or that those with little education are more confident that they can treat their illness themselves with overthecounter medicines. These results are in line with the negative impacts of all employment statuses (with not working as a comparison base). This may indicate that there is a high opportunity cost of not going to work because of illness and using health services for consultation.
Household income, which is proxied by food expenditure, is significant in determining health service utilisation. The richer the person, the more he or she uses health services when sick. This indicates that there could still be budget constraints to health service utilisation-even among the poor, who receive free health services but still have to cover the travel costs of reaching health facilities. That this could be a problem is borne out by table 3, which shows that the farther a person is from a health centre, the less likely he or she is to use the health centre when sick.
The quality of health services also seems to matter. The farther a person is from a provincial capital (that is, if a person has to go to a local health centre, which most likely provides a lower quality of service than those in the provincial capital), the less likely they are to use health services when sick. Those living outside Java-Bali, except those in Nusa Tenggara, are also less likely to use health services-probably because the availability and quality of health services are better in Java-Bali than elsewhere in Indonesia, or because information about the importance of seeking accredited medical treatment is more readily available in Java-Bali. It is puzzling, however, that those living in Nusa Tenggara tend to use health services more often than those in Java-Bali when they are sick. Perhaps the types of illnesses suffered by those in Nusa Tenggara in 2007 required more frequent professional medical treatment than those elsewhere (Pakasi et al. 2009 , Soenarto et al. 2009 ).
Users of Health Insurance
In seeking to understand who uses health insurance in Indonesia, we add interaction variables between having health insurance and different individual and location characteristics and then observe the coefficients of the variables. Table  4 shows the marginal effects of the interaction variables. Except for health insurance, the marginal effects of the original variables are hardly affected by including these additional variables.
We focus here on understanding the situation in regions where people generally use health services when they are sick and have health insurance. The absence of the Java-Bali dummy variable indicates that Java-Bali is the based variable in this equation. This means that the marginal effects of different regions have to be seen relative to the condition in Java-Bali (for example, the 0.02 in Sulawesi means that the impact of health insurance in Kalimantan is two percentage points higher than the impact in Java-Bali). The result indicates that having health insurance in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi tends to encourage the owners to use health services more frequently than in Java-Bali-that is, health insurance companies and schemes tend to 'better help' people on those islands to access health services than they do people in Java-Bali. This is not the case in Nusa Tenggara; the effectiveness of health insurance in increasing health in those regions is not better than in Java-Bali. In Maluku-Papua, people who have health insurance tend to use health services more when they feel sick than do those in Java-Bali. Yet this is not the case when we include those who do not feel sick; having health insurance does not encourage people in Maluku-Papua to seek preventive care. Table 4 shows an insignificant positive coefficient of interaction between having health insurance and the time needed to reach the nearest health centre. It means that having health insurance encourages the use of health services the farther the person is from a health centre, but the effect is small. Having health insurance does help those whose travel costs are high to come to a health centre when they are sick. A positive and significant coefficient for distance to the provincial capital and health insurance could mean that having health insurance encourages people far from the provincial capital to use a local health centre, even though the services are not as good as those in the provincial capital. Downloaded by [Australian National University] at 02:09 13 December 2014
On education, table 4 shows that the higher the level of education a person has when sick, the more that having health insurance encourages them to use health services. On household income, table 4 reveals that having health insurance encourages people with low incomes to use health services. Hence, health insurance does relax the budget constraints of individuals.
Kinds of Illness
To understand the kinds of illnesses that encourage people to use health services when they have health insurance, we estimate model (1a) for those reporting similar illnesses (table 5). The highest impact of having health insurance on health service utilisation is from asthma attacks or breathing difficulties, while the lowest impact is from diarrhoea. This is understandable, since Indonesians tend to treat asthma attacks and breathing difficulties as more serious illnesses than diarrhoea. 
CONCLUSION
The main result of this article is that having health insurance increases the probability of people using health services by approximately eight percentage points when they feel sick or by approximately five percentage points if we include those who do not feel sick. A loose interpretation of this result is as follows. In 2007, 27% of Indonesia's population had health insurance. Providing the other 73% of the population with health insurance means that an additional 4% of the population will use health services-that is, that the number of people who had been outpatients in the previous month will increase from 14% of the population to 18%, or that the number of people who were outpatients in the previous month will increase by 29%. We estimate that private health insurance, health cost reimbursement by a company, and Jamsostek have a lower impact on increasing the use of health services than other health insurance schemes. The poor are less likely than other groups to have one of these three types of health insurance. If they have health insurance, the poor mostly have one of the other types of health insurance-the impacts of which are higher. This result indicates that the poor benefit most from the provision of health insurance. In addition, the lower the household income, as proxied by household food expenditure, the greater the impact of having health insurance on health service utilisation.
Having health insurance does encourage the use of health services by those who live far from health facilities, especially those who live far from the provincial capital and do not have health facilities nearby that are as good as those in the provincial capital. Although some budget constraints remain, having health insurance does help to relax household budget constraints: people with health insurance tend to seek professional medical treatment when a member of the household is sick. Hence, if the goal of providing health insurance is to encourage sick people to seek professional medical treatment-to be an enabling factor, as discussed in the literature review-this goal is likely to be achieved. Note: All equations include control variables for sex, age, household size, education, employment status, sector of employment, gross regional product per capita, and district health budget, and use food expenditure as the proxy for income.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
The question remains whether increasing the probability of using health services by five to eight percentage points is good enough, considering the large cost to the government of providing health insurance-particularly subsidised insurance. This question is not within the scope of this article, and further studies are needed. This article does, however, indicate the importance of other factors in encouraging the use of health services; its policy implications include the need to have more health centres, particularly in remote areas, and to provide better quality health services. To encourage higher utilisation of health services and to promote the health of the population, the government needs programs that relax household budget constraints and improve the supply side of health services.
Indonesia's health care system has been relatively well developed to overcome challenges of increasing demand for health service utilisation (such as during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis). Nevertheless, stronger commitment-not only from the central government but also from local governments-is required to respond to the difficulties of providing health services for everyone. This commitment may involve developing incentives for the private sector to provide more health services, particularly in remote areas. Balancing priorities among those programs is only one of the challenges faced by the Indonesian government in encouraging greater health service utilisation; the government might benefit from improving its programs incrementally and implementing strong monitoring and evaluation processes.
